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Our understanding of tuberculosis (TB) transmission dynamics has been refined by genotyping of Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis strains. The National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network was
designed and implemented to systematically evaluate the role of genotyping technology in improving TB
prevention and control activities. Genotyping proved a useful adjunct to investigations of outbreaks,
unusual clusters, and laboratory cross-contamination. 
“In the future, the battle against this plague of mankind will not just
be concerned with an uncertain something but with a tangible para-
site, about whose characteristics a great deal is known and can be
explored.”
—Robert Koch, 1882
olecular genetic typing (or genotyping) of Mycobacte-
rium tuberculosis strains has revolutionized the field of
tuberculosis (TB) research, prevention, and control (1–3). The
subtypes characterized by molecular genetic typing methods
provide a greater power and ability to differentiate strains than
previous methods, such as comparisons of patterns of drug
resistance or phage-typing (4,5). When molecular genotyping
technology is applied to outbreaks or unusual clusters of dis-
ease, persons sharing M. tuberculosis strains can be identified,
which can lead to important clues about the pattern and
dynamics of transmission. 
Methods of molecular genotyping have been increasingly
applied to the epidemiology of TB. Because of its natural his-
tory, the transmission of M. tuberculosis is difficult to study;
M. tuberculosis is spread by airborne droplets of respiratory
secretions expelled by an infectious person to a susceptible
host, who may or may not be known to the source (6). The
bacterium can remain latent as an asymptomatic infection for
years, and the source of such infections can be difficult to
ascertain. Thus, the places and persons involved in a chain of
transmission may be puzzling to identify or exclude. Molecu-
lar typing of M. tuberculosis adds important pieces to the con-
struction of such a transmission puzzle; persons who harbor
the same strain of M. tuberculosis are likely to have shared that
strain in a common chain of transmission; by contrast, persons
who are infected by unique and distinct strains were probably
infected by means of a different exposure. Among its applica-
tions, genotyping has served to elucidate the poorly under-
stood role of relapses and exogenous reinfection of persons
with recurrent TB after cure. Several reports have relied on
DNA genotyping to describe and document the occurrence of
exogenous reinfection with distinct strains of M. tuberculosis
as the cause of TB following successful treatment (7–9). 
The usefulness of molecular typing was also confirmed in
several epidemiologic investigations of HIV-associated multi-
drug-resistant TB outbreaks in hospices, hospitals, and prisons
during the late 1980s and early 1990s and provided compelling
evidence of institutional transmission (10–16). Unique fea-
tures of these outbreaks included prolonged infectiousness of
patients who were not recognized to harbor multidrug-resistant
TB until months after their TB was diagnosed and the rela-
tively rapid progression from latent infection to active TB dis-
ease in persons with HIV-associated immunosuppression.
These data were also used to state the need to implement effec-
tive interventions to halt such outbreaks (17,18).
In addition to the use of DNA genotyping during out-
break investigations, the technology has been applied as a
complementary tool to conventional methods in TB control
(19–22). In two of the earliest studies conducted in the
United States, one in San Francisco and one in New York
City, the authors assumed that M. tuberculosis isolates with
matching DNA fingerprints were epidemiologically related
and represented recent transmission of M. tuberculosis
among the patients involved (i.e., within 2 years before diag-
nosis) (19–20). In these studies, 30% to 40% of the patients
had M. tuberculosis isolates with DNA fingerprint patterns
that matched at least one other isolate. This finding led the
authors to conclude that as many as 40% of TB cases in these
two cities were the result of recent transmission and that TB
control practices in San Francisco and New York were not
effectively decreasing M. tuberculosis transmission. The
observations in these two reports were useful and innovative.
However, the findings could not be generalized to other geo-
graphic areas in the United States because the study popula-
tions were exclusively urban residents, a large proportion
were HIV infected, and detailed epidemiologic information *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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was incomplete for either study, which limited the ability to
corroborate actual contacts or exposures among the TB
patients studied. 
A separate study evaluated the use of DNA genotyping in
TB patients from a large, rural population in the state of Arkan-
sas (21). Analysis of M. tuberculosis isolates from TB patients
for a 2-year period (1992–1993) found that more than half the
isolates matched at least one other patient isolate. Epidemio-
logic investigation of the patients with matching M. tuberculo-
sis isolates (i.e., clustered cases) revealed 24 persons who had
documented latent TB infection or active TB many years in the
past but which produced disease with matching isolates at the
time of the study. In five of these patients, a remote epidemio-
logic connection (i.e., common exposures to a person with TB)
was identified that occurred 20–25 years earlier. The authors
also reported that some TB patients had isolates showing iden-
tical specific patterns, yet their geographic, social, and medical
histories were so disparate that transmission among them was
highly unlikely. Further investigation by genotyping with an
independent method revealed that the capacity of the IS6110
method to differentiate strains was roughly proportional to the
number of bands present in the original fingerprint pattern.
Thus, isolates with a low number of bands (e.g., fewer than
five) required a second method for appropriate differentiation.
These findings suggested the need for additional assessments
and evaluations of emerging assumptions in the interpretation
of DNA genotyping of M. tuberculosis.
The fruitful use of DNA genotyping to confirm and refine
our understanding of M. tuberculosis transmission in out-
breaks provided the major impetus to evaluate the use of this
technology in other settings and to determine its broader appli-
cation as a tool in TB prevention and control. Specifically, we
sought to assess the usefulness of this technology in searching
for unidentified outbreaks, identifying risk factors for TB at
the population level, and identifying and monitoring labora-
tory cross-contamination (23). Consequently, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) funded six laboratories
in 1993 to develop regional databases of DNA genotype fin-
gerprint patterns and undertake regional molecular epidemio-
logic studies. This genotyping network was expanded in 1996
to include sentinel surveillance sampling. Ultimately, the
National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network
comprised CDC, seven laboratories, and seven sentinel sur-
veillance sites in the United States.
Objectives and Composition of the National 
Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveillance Network
Successful applicants for a cooperative agreement with
CDC formed part of the genotyping network. The following
six potential objectives were to be the focus of activities by the
network: 
1. Determine the Relative Frequency of M. tuberculosis
Strains on the Basis of DNA Fingerprint Patterns by Using the
IS6110 Method in Specific Geographic Areas. This determina-
tion was meant to characterize the diversity of strains in any
one area or region and allow for more accurate interpretation
of results of DNA fingerprint analysis. 
2. Determine the Extent of Spread of Related M. tuberculo-
sis Strains in Communities. As a secondary objective, the
identification of common and potentially more transmissible
strains could aid in the study of M. tuberculosis pathogenesis
and host immunity.
3. Describe the Geographic Mobility of Related M. tuber-
culosis Strains and the Mode in Which Strains Spread. The
characterization of places and activities involved in potential
transmission could enable TB control programs to design
interventions accordingly. 
4. Determine the Relatedness of M. tuberculosis Isolates in
Patients Who Are Identified as Being a High Risk for TB
through Conventional Epidemiologic Studies. DNA finger-
print clustering of isolates among groups at high risk could
represent a relatively more specific marker of recent transmis-
sion when compared to clustering identified in the general
population. 
5. Develop the Capacity of Local TB Controllers To Iden-
tify Patients with Related M. tuberculosis Organisms Who
Deserve Careful Consideration and Investigation To Identify
Ongoing Transmission. A secondary objective was to assess
the role of fingerprinting in helping to prioritize and focus con-
tact investigations.
6. Assess Use of DNA Fingerprinting Analyses in Guiding
TB Control Activities, such as Targeted Testing and Treatment
of Latent TB Infection and Monitoring Possibilities for Trans-
mission in Congregate Settings such as Hospitals and Prisons.
Federal funds were provided for the TB genotyping network to
establish a core set of databases at each of the laboratories and
sentinel surveillance sites and a national database at CDC. The
laboratory databases included computerized images of DNA
fingerprint patterns from all M. tuberculosis isolates analyzed
for their region and for all isolates analyzed for their sentinel
surveillance site. The databases at the sentinel sites included a
record for each sentinel area resident who was diagnosed with
culture-positive TB. The record contained information col-
lected as part of routine TB national surveillance activities; the
identification of source or secondary cases, if known; and the
DNA fingerprint pattern designation. Routine surveillance for
TB included information for each patient concerning demo-
graphics, social and occupational risk factors for TB; clinical
and radiologic details of disease; culture, strain, and histology
results; susceptibility testing of isolates; and antibiotic treat-
ment regimens and clinical outcome. At CDC, DNA finger-
print images, surveillance, and epidemiologic information
were combined from all laboratories and sites to create
national databases of sentinel site patients and a library of all
unique DNA fingerprint patterns among isolates from sentinel
surveillance site patients.
Sentinel Surveillance Sites and Regional Laboratories
Sentinel surveillance sites in the network included the
states of Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, andTUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
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New Jersey; six counties in California (Alameda, Contra
Costa, Marin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Solano); and four
counties in Texas (Dallas, Tarrant, Cameron, and Hidalgo). All
patients within those areas were included on a prospective
basis. The sentinel surveillance sites were selected on the basis
of applications by state and large-city departments of health
and by characteristics of the proposed sentinel populations. 
The following criteria were used to evaluate sites applying
through competitive proposals: 1) understand the use of M.
tuberculosis DNA fingerprinting in the epidemiology of TB;
2) report at least 250 TB cases per year, and submit one M.
tuberculosis isolate for 75% of culture-positive patients in
their areas for DNA fingerprinting; 3) conduct active surveil-
lance of TB cases; 4) review information from the national TB
surveillance database and make every effort to ensure that data
are complete; 5) establish and maintain a surveillance site
database; and 6) maintain records of activities performed as
part of the genotyping network.
The network sentinel surveillance site relied on local
mycobacteriology and hospital infection control records for all
facilities in the surveillance site areas for case finding. Other
sources of information included hospital IDC-9 discharge
codes for TB, pharmacy records for prescriptions of a combi-
nation of two or more anti-TB drugs, coroners’ records that
showed TB as a diagnosis, and AIDS surveillance reports that
indicated a diagnosis of TB. Sentinel surveillance site person-
nel reviewed the information in their national surveillance
database to ensure that all information was complete to the
extent possible.
The regional laboratories were also selected on a competi-
tive basis. They were responsible for providing DNA finger-
print analysis of M. tuberculosis isolates from health
departments in their region and for their assigned sentinel sur-
veillance site. Regions were assigned to laboratories on the
basis of history of their work and approximate numbers of TB
patients in the regions. Each culture-positive TB case normally
reported for national TB surveillance (on the form, Report of a
Verified Case of Tuberculosis) within the sentinel site area was
included as a sentinel surveillance case. An isolate from each
culture-positive TB patient was sent for DNA fingerprinting at
the designated regional DNA fingerprinting laboratory. M.
tuberculosis isolates were shipped from sentinel sites to labo-
ratories in approved shipping containers that were appropri-
ately labeled and handled in accordance with bio-safety level 3
conditions. Subcultures of isolates were to be stored by the
regional laboratories at –70°C in duplicate indefinitely.
At the regional laboratories, images of individual DNA
fingerprint patterns of M. tuberculosis isolates were generated
by using standardized procedures for DNA extraction, purifi-
cation, digestion, electrophoresis, hybridization, and comput-
erization. Individual images were electronically transmitted to
CDC to be assigned a national DNA fingerprint designation.
Each submitted fingerprint pattern was compared to previ-
ously submitted patterns. Unique patterns were added to the
database and assigned consecutive five-digit numbers as their
national designations. Results of analysis of isolates and DNA
fingerprint designations were reported back to the regional
DNA fingerprinting laboratories on a regular basis. The results
of DNA fingerprint analysis of sentinel surveillance TB case
isolates, including the national DNA fingerprint database pat-
tern designations, were transmitted from the regional laborato-
ries to the sentinel surveillance sites.
This special issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases con-
tains the reports of the various analyses resulting from this
highly productive collaboration of the National Tuberculosis
Genotyping and Surveillance Network. The results represent a
remarkable accomplishment and provide the scientific basis
for future potential applications of DNA genotyping as part of
population-based TB prevention and control activities in the
United States. The results also highlight both the strengths and
limitations of DNA genotyping as an adjunct to TB outbreak
and contact investigations and assessments of laboratory
cross-contamination. Although the network has been very pro-
ductive, additional technologic advances are necessary as well
as improvements in the understanding and use of principles
and practices from other disciplines, such as social network
analyses, before we can reliably obtain real-time laboratory
results and improve our understanding of events facilitating
the transmission of M. tuberculosis in modern societies. Such a
comprehensive approach that combines both basic and opera-
tional research must be supported so that our efforts will ulti-
mately result in the elimination of TB (24).
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